The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations[1]. The situation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained relatively calm with no ceasefire violations recorded by the SMM. The SMM observed tensions but no incidents during the blockade of the three crossing points to Crimea.
In the Donetsk region the SMM observed an overall calm security situation. The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations at Donetsk airport and other monitored hotspot areas and noted no considerable military movement. For instance, in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM spoke to a resident who indicated that the situation was calm during the previous day.
In Donetsk city the SMM noted billboards advertising the holding of the so-called “local elections” in “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled areas of Donetsk region on 18 October.
The SMM did not observe any ceasefire violations in the Luhansk region, as the overall situation remained calm. However, while in government-controlled Chabanivka (63km north-west of Luhansk) the Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that one Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier was killed and another wounded the previous day by an explosion of a booby trap that they had triggered near a government checkpoint located 2.7km east of government-controlled Novotoshkivske (52km north-west of Luhansk), some 500m north of the contact line.
The SMM was informed by “Luhansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) armed personnel near Smile (32km north-west of Luhansk) that the night before they had heard several explosions in the area of “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (37km north-west of Luhansk). This claim was further clarified and corroborated in a separate discussion with an “LPR” commander in Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) who claimed he had heard the night before six explosions caused by mortar impacts in the vicinity of Sokilnyky.
In Novotoshkivske the SMM observed three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-2), which were parked along the road. While in Debaltseve (55km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM witnessed a joint tactical training involving both “DPR” and “LPR” armed groups. The SMM could see ten main battle tanks (T-64) some 200m north of the main road, and six BMPs located about 1km to the south. The SMM observed no firing of weapons.
The SMM visited a school in “LPR”-controlled Tsentralnyi (60km south-west of Luhansk), where it was approached by the school principal, the “head” of the city “administration”, and the “deputy commander” of “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Luch (55km south-west of Luhansk) who asked for “LPR” registration papers. The SMM was also requested to show “LPR” registration papers by the head doctor at the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Antratsyt (53km south-west of Luhansk), as a prerequisite for agreeing to meet.
In “LPR”-controlled Fashchivka (61km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM visited a coal enrichment factory, which employed about 150 people according to a Cossack commander providing security to the facility. The factory reportedly operated at low capacity, and according to the interlocutor was not going to increase production until next year due to lacking some equipment spare parts.
The SMM visited seven Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, which corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At six of the areas the SMM observed that a total of 16 pieces of restricted military equipment were missing. As recorded by the SMM since 9 July 2015 a towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152-mm) was missing from one area, and two howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152-mm) were missing from the second. A third site lacked two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint, 152-mm) since 9 July 2015, and at a fourth area, the SMM recorded three howitzers (2A36 Giatsint, 152-mm) as absent. Three and five multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS BM-21 Grad, 122-mm) were missing from the fifth and sixth site respectively, in line with SMM observation from 12 July 2015.
The SMM also visited three “DPR”-controlled heavy weapons holding areas, and found six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100-mm) missing at one of these sites.
Based on aerial surveillance imagery available, the SMM observed a towed artillery piece in the area of government-controlled Dmytrivka (50km north of Mariupol), which is 19km away from the contact line and inside the withdrawal area for this type of weapon. The SMM also recorded a cluster of 32 military trucks at the same location.
In Kharkiv the SMM learned from the head of the Railway Border Guard Station that there have not been attempts to illegally cross the border lately. He referred to an exceptional case three months earlier when his unit prevented the smuggling of infrared night vision scopes and telescopic sights for rifles on the train from the Russian Federation into Ukraine.
In Odessa region the SMM monitored a demonstration at the border crossing point of Kuchurgan (40km west of Odessa) on the Transdniestrian controlled segment of the Moldovan - Ukrainian border. It was organized by 25 activists carrying the flags of the civilian section of Azov volunteer battalion. Despite calls of some demonstrators to stop the passage of goods into Transdniestria they did not block the road leading to the border crossing point and only handed out leaflets with patriotic messages to the vehicle drivers heading towards the border.
At the crossing points to Crimea, in the Kherson region, the SMM observed a relatively calm situation, which was occasionally marked by verbal duels between the protesters and the truck drivers (see coverage of these events starting on 20 September in SMM Daily Report 21 September 2015). The truck drivers told the SMM in Chaplynka that they were unwilling to leave the area before being refunded the money they paid for custom declarations, which reportedly amounted to a few hundred euros per cargo. The SMM facilitated a dialogue between the drivers and a customs officer, who stated that he was going to invite the shift commander to explain the procedure for being refunded.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Dnepropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate:
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Members of the “LPR” continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation.
Besides the above-mentioned general restrictions that continue, the SMM was on 21 September not subject to any specific restriction of its freedom of movement.